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Abstract 
 
The paper is focused on the latest information asymmetry issue in the Czech Republic on the retail banking services market. The 
problem considers credit union (savings cooperative) business that seemed stable after the problematic restructure 10 years ago. 
But during this January the payment from Deposit Insurance Fund of the Czech Republic had to compensate the consumers of the 
MSD credit union. This subject provided services with higher interest rates even during the last years of technically zero interest 
rate of the central bank. A question information asymmetry and the moral hazard arose again. All that is written in famous study 
for European central bank by Vesala et Gropp supporting the explicit deposit insurance system is correct but the conditions has 
partially changed. Credit unions try to compete with banks undertaking a higher level of credit risk but still being within Basel II 
accords. The paper is considering the question of the future development – to try to compete with the conventional banks as FIO 
credit union successfully did or to return to “Austrian” model. Next future trend is outlined in sum up of the deposit insurance 
system characteristics backed by other several studies. Also the problem of information asymmetry overcome is being discussed 
with the result that mostly used monitoring indicator cannot be applied to credit union market.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The banking industry is an environment where the information asymmetry takes its role in many parts. This paper 
is focused on deposit retail banking services. Due to the nature and the role of banking industry in modern economy 
differs from other markets. Other markets mostly rely on rationality and vigilance of the consumers when choosing 
their supplier. However on this market a public or state-guaranteed insurance supports trust in the market. This 
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environment may lead to moral hazard (refers here to the tendency of insurance protection to alter an individual's 
motive to prevent loss.) caused by unobservable behaviour and the insurance system. This question arose on the 
deposit retail banking services lately because of the MSD credit union bankruptcy in December 2013. 
 
2. Legal framework and related works 
 
2.1. National deposit insurance funds 
 
The European Communities (1994) established that all member states have to adopt a system of deposit 
insurance, which guarantees compensation in the amount of at least 20 000 EUR with a maximum of 10 % 
participation and less from the side of the claim-holder (households and non-financial companies). Due to the global 
financial crisis in 2008 a further significant increase in guarantees was approved on the ECOFIN. A new guarantee 
would be across the EU increased to at least EUR 50 000. Also another major change was discussed – full insurance. 
Most countries adopted 0 % participation model to support the claim-holders’ trust. In 2009, see European 
Communities (2009), was approved with the target of 100 000 EUR limit since 2011.   
In the Czech Republic a Deposit insurance fund (further only as DIF) is established accordingly the Act No. 
21/1992 Coll., as amended. Main characterises can be retrieved from Deposit insurance fund (2014). All banks, 
credit unions (further only as CUs) and branches of foreign banks participate in the deposit-claims insurance scheme 
by contribution of 0, 04 % of the average volume of insured deposit claims for the relevant calendar quarter. If the 
volume of funds of the Fund rises over 1, 5% of the average volume of insured deposit claims then the contribution 
is divided by 4. The bank shall calculate the average volume of insured deposit claims using the stock of insured 
deposit claims as of the last day of each calendar month of the relevant calendar quarter. DIF automatically insures 
current, savings, term and deposit accounts held for individuals and legal entities (non-financial). 
 
2.2. Moral hazard on the deposit insurance backed market 
 
Generally, considering the moral hazard, the studies test hypothesis that the public safety net, providing 
assistance to banks in distress (this includes “the last resort” creditor as well) and protecting banks’ claim-holders 
from losses (deposit insurance fund), increases the propensity by bank managers to take on excessive risk (credit or 
market one). Another general opinion is that introduction of such system-wide insurance is detrimental to market 
discipline, respectively increases the moral hazard. There is mentioned also a double moral hazard issue including to 
managers change in behaviour also depositors. Within the insurance system the demand does not have to be vigilant 
any more since there is no risk (we abstract from time delay in repayment from the insurance system). Gropp and 
Vesala (2004) studied that problem focused in the banks. They studied countries that did not provide deposit 
insurance until the European Communities (1994) introduced it. The result was rather surprising and in conflict to 
general approach. Risk-taking activities were reduced by banks with higher amount of subordinated debt, low 
charter values and smaller market share. The establishing of the explicit system removed implicit 
insurance/government-backed system expectation. However the bailout rescue was not abandoned later in 2009, this 
result was the only logical explanation. Another important study by Bichler & Mächler (2001) shows that fund 
insurance prevents the “run on bank” scenario for weaker banks considering insured deposits. But in the Swiss 
system there were also uninsured ones. Every bank had a limit to which the sum of deposit is insured. This means 
that middle and large institutions have the deposits insured only partially. They show that this system does not 
negate the depositor response to bank balance sheet characteristics since variations in banks specific fundamentals 
can explain 75 % of the variation in uninsured savings deposits. Borio, Hunter, Kaufman, & Tsatsaronis (2004) sum 
up the problem regarding market indicators prediction of bank fragility that can significantly reduce moral hazard in 
uninsured or just partially insured environment. Of all the possibilities they choose Distance to default as leading 
indicators of bank fragility. So the empirical analysis does not support the general theoretical conclusion. However 
Borio et al. (2004, p. 113) emphasize that “Financial innovation will tend to be a step ahead of regulators and banks’ 
opaqueness may have only increased by trends towards off-balance-sheet operations and by the use of financial 
instruments whose precise risk characteristics may be difficult to understand.”. This note was foreseeing considering 
the 2008-2010 events.  
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3. The latest case in the Czech republic and recommendation 
 
3.1. Credit union segment and MSD case 
 
Czech Republic CU segment underwent its own crisis, as a bank segment did, years before the crisis, there is the 
DIF and so it is expected more or less safe by the general public. There are 12 CU subjects on the market. A bank 
segment is major one considering basic services however the CU segment shows significant increase in deposit 
during the last years, see table below.  
 
                                   Table 1. Shares of bank and CU segments in financial sector assets in %, source: own elaboration based on (Czech national 
bank, 2013b). 
 
Sector/Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Bank segment 76,5 77,3 77,2 77,4 78,1 77,2 
Credit union segment 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,7 
 
For the year 2013 a share of CUs is estimated at 0, 9 % showing the continuing trend. Clients are price or better 
“interest sensitive”. CUs’ clients gain better interest because CUs provide loans to riskier debtors (usually they 
failed to borrow money from the bank). Unions’ balance sheets do not have to show signs of significant risk added 
to their business and even the additional indices, such as Basel accords, do not show significant risk taking. From 
the (Tůma, 2012) there were chosen 2 CUs with the highest ratio of nonperforming loans (above 10 %) and the 
MSD that has significantly lower rate to be compared in capital adequacy, see the chart lower. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MSD shows capital adequacy above the Basel II requirements and its level is more stable than Akcenta CU. MSD 
clients were not warned from the balance sheet, nonperforming loans ratio nor the capital adequacy about the 
possible problems of the MSD. The only message suggesting risk increase was from the side of the financial market 
supervisor and regulator (Czech national bank, 2013a): “The situation  in  the  credit  union  segment,  where  risk  
indicators  are  rising, remains  unsatisfactory,  with  some  institutions  exhibiting  low  prudence in their business 
activities.” and “The credit union sector also shows a high concentration of loans provided.  Any repayment 
problems among important clients could jeopardise the unions’ stability.” Regulator also stress double ratio of 
nonperforming loans compared to banks however those warnings were a bit vague and addressing CUs as a whole. 
Specific information about the MSD situation was absent. An insolvency petition was submitted to city court of 
Prague at the end of the year 2013 and one month later DIF started to repay the deposits. Clients can claim their 
deposits till 2017 however during the first month was paid away already around 96 % of total deposits. Repayment 
process uses the branches of the largest retail bank on the market Česká spořitelna (Erste group). 
 
7
9
11
13
15
17
1.Q
2011
2.Q
2011
3.Q
2011
4.Q
2011
1.Q
2012
2.Q
2012
3.Q
2012
4.Q
2012
1.Q
2013
2.Q
2013
3.Q
2013
Akcenta Creditas MSD BASEL II
Fig. 1. capital adequacy in % 2011-2013, source: own elaboration based on (Akcenta, 2014), (Creditas, 2014), (MSD 2014).  
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3.2. Recommendations 
 
In this situation the bank segment clients ask why risk-taking clients are fully compensated from their money on 
insurance (0, 04 %) and CU segment clients ask how they were supposed to find MSD would go bankruptcy 
(financial fundamentals were not different from other CUs and regulator warning was not a direct one). Under the 
specific conditions on the market there should be reconsidered a proposal of the previous government (Czech 
Republic parliament, 2013). If the regulator evaluates the whole segment as risky (much thorough analysis is needed 
to agree, let us presume it is true) and the market did no responded then there should be much higher premium. The 
provisional government proposed but not approved a law modification that doubles the contribution of the CUs to 
DIF. However there was not explained how or from what this figure was derived from. When reconsidering this 
proposal a variable contribution should be considered. A capital adequacy and previous level of nonperforming 
loans can be the base of the calculation. When the situation will improve, economic growth will be stable etc. the 
participation question should be reconsidered. Even low participation can significantly motivate (as mentioned in 
previous part). This participation can be again variable accordingly the risk-taking behaviour showed by the bank or 
CU. The participation can be also in form of a tax and it would be a progressive one. In case of bankruptcy and 
repayment the deposits would be repaid accordingly the rule “the more is put to risk the less is insured”. For low 
deposit (less than equivalent of 6 median EU month salaries) there would be 0 % tax, then per every two-year year 
salary tier there would be higher tax with the top of the double rate of the previous participation – in 20 %. Then the 
anticipated reaction would correspond with Bichler & Mächler (2001) results. Also part of the proposal is redefine 
the CU status by setting a balance sheet limit at 5 bln. CZK (180 mil. EUR). CUs with higher balance will have to 
transform into banks meeting the bank requirements that are more demanding that CU requirements. This would 
clearly state whether the CU will follow former Fio CU and holding that successfully transformed into stable bank 
or will stay as “Austrian model” CU) – smaller more regional financial services provider with deep knowledge of 
the local business. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
The latest case in the Czech Republic does not correspond to mentioned empirical studies and is closer to the 
general theory of the detriment to the market discipline due to state guaranteed system of deposit insurance. 
However there has to mentioned that financial literacy in Czech Republic was for a very long time neglected. 
However the situation improves a percent of the clients that at least download and open the financial market 
regulator or their bank annual report is extremely low and cannot be matched to the situation in the Switzerland 
analysed by Bichler & Mächler (2001). Also there is a question why the distance to default or ratings were not 
mentioned in recommendations as important indices for MSD assessment. For distance to default calculation a risk 
free rate, balance sheet and price and number of stocks data for at least a year are needed. The last variable is a 
problem. Some banks’ and almost all CUs’ shares are not traded on the Prague stock exchange (PX) neither the can 
be traded on the OTC market called RM system. So we cannot calculate this indicator. Similar problem are the 
ratings. Only the larger banks in the Czech Republic are regularly evaluated by respected rating companies. The idea 
of rating by the Czech national bank was abandoned few years ago and it seems that neither the parliament nor the 
Czech national bank supports this idea. 
 
5. Conclussion 
 
The moral hazard problem is present on the CU segment and the problem’s scale is increased by the set of other 
conditions such as 0 % participation DIF, absence of key indices (such as ratings and distance to default indicator), 
lower financial literacy, no warnings from the capital adequacy ratio, vague information from the financial market 
regulator. This is why the latest case in the Czech Republic does not correspond to mentioned empirical studies. As 
a recommendation there is proposed an increase in premium from CUs to DIF and reintroduction of the participation 
– available also in form of progressive tax in case of repayment. Also it is recommended to approve the proposal of 
the balance sheet limit at 180 mil. EUR for the CU subject. 
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